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It has recently been suggested that Michael Friedman’s 'relativized a priori' leads to incommensurability and therefore irrationality in theory change. Dan McArthur (2008) argues that this problem can be avoided by adopting structural realism. I offer several reasons for which this argument should be rejected. I also argue that the desired marriage of Friedman's view and structural realism is not obvious because their compatibility is usually questioned due to the Kantian presuppositions of the former and the mind-independent premise of the latter. I argue that the views can be made compatible by suggesting that structural realism does not necessarily adopt the metaphysical premise of scientific realism and also by arguing that on a closer exploration, Friedman's view does not imply mind-dependence. 
	The structure of the paper is the following. The second section introduces Friedman's view about the relativized a priori.  The third introduces structural realism and how it accounts for theory change. In the fourth section I present McArthur's argument, which suggests that the problem of irrationality that arises for Friedman's view can be resolved if structural realism is adopted. In the fifth section I argue against this suggestion, first, because the employment of semi-realism as a general structural realist position is unjustified, second, because McArthur's accusation that Friedman's notion of rationality is retrospective cannot be saved by structural realism because the rationality structural realism can establish is also retrospective, and third, because the argument would have to commit McArthur to the conclusion that relativized a priori that have been structurally preserved in theory change are interaction properties. In the sixth section I explore whether structural realism and Friedman's view can be made compatible despite objections stated in the literature. In particular, I argue that structural realism does not necessarily depend on the mind-independence premise and as a consequence can be compatible with Friedman's view but more importantly I argue that on a closer exploration Friedman's view does not imply mind-dependence. The seventh section is the conclusion. 

2.	Friedman’s relativized a priori

Friedman’s view of the relativized a priori stems from the worry that not all hypotheses in scientific theories are directly falsifiable by experience but they nevertheless play an important role for the derivation of empirical content. Following Poincaré's (1902) argument that geometry has a conventional status and Reichenbach's (1920) suggestion  that the notion of simultaneity in the special theory of relativity is conventional – is a constitutive a priori part of the theory – Friedman (2001) develops the notion of the relativized a priori. The idea is that scientific theories are comprised of two parts: the purely empirical part and the constitutive (conventional) part. The former can be subjected to empirical test only if the latter are in place. But these principles are not fixed across theory change. Every theory has its relativized a priori principles. 'Relativized' indicates their dynamical character, the fact that the constitutive principles change when a theory is superseded by another one, but are 'a priori' because they play a constitutive role. 
The constitutive principles belong to two categories, they can be either mathematical or physical principles. According to Friedman, the relativized a priori principles include “both the relevant mathematical principles used in formulating the theory (Euclidean geometry, the geometry of Minkowski space-time, the Riemannian theory of manifolds) and certain particular fundamental physical principles (the Newtonian laws of motion, the light principle, the equivalence principle)” (2001, 71).   
	We can identify the relativized a priori as principles that are presupposed for the derivation of empirical content of a theory and that in isolation cannot be considered as being empirical. As Friedman suggests:
 
Relativity theory involves a priori constitutive principles as necessary presuppositions of its properly empirical claims, just as much as did Newtonian physics, but these principles have essentially changed in the transition from the latter theory to the former: whereas Euclidean geometry is indeed constitutive a priori in the context of Newtonian physics, for example, only infinitesimally Euclidean geometry – consistent with all possible values of the curvature – is constitutively a priori in the context of general relativity. What we end up with, in this transition, is thus a relativized and dynamical conception of a priori mathematical-physical principles, which change and develop along with the development of the mathematical and physical sciences themselves (Friedman 2001, 31). 

In order to formulate the empirically testable law of gravitation, Friedman argues, one must fix the Newtonian space-time structure. This is done by employing Euclidean geometry and Galilean kinematics which function as conventions within Newtonian mechanics. In the special theory of relativity the presupposed conventional framework is formed by Lorentzian kinematics and Minkowski space-time structure. Having fixed the conventional framework, laws, such as Maxwell’s laws of electromagnetism, can be subjected to empirical test. Finally, in the general theory of relativity, according to Friedman, the empirically testable laws are Einstein’s field equations while the conventional content is comprised by the infinitesimally Lorentzian manifold space-time structure which admits for any Riemannian metric structure.  




Structural realism is traditionally motivated by the pessimistic meta-induction and the no miracles argument. It provides a realist-enough position that accounts for the success of scientific theories, given their correct predictions and unificatory power, but skeptical enough so that it avoids the charges coming from the constant failure of past theories to reveal the hidden nature of the world. As John Worrall (1989) suggests, we should be realist about the structure, expressed in the mathematical equations that are preserved in theory change, and not about the ontology, to which theories would commit us were we to read them literally. 
	Structural realism suggests that science is cumulative. In theory change there are elements of the old theory that are retained in the new one. This preservation is structural, not ontological. It is expressed in the mathematical equations of empirically successful theories. As Worrall suggests, in the transition from Fresnel’s theory to Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism the equations of the former theory are approximately preserved in the latter theory. However, these equations carry different interpretations: in Fresnel’s theory light is a disturbance in the ether, in Maxwell’s theory the disturbance is due to the nature of the electromagnetic field. According to Worrall: 

There was an important element of continuity in the shift from Fresnel to Maxwell—and this was much more than a simple question of carrying over the successful empirical content into the new theory. At the same time it was rather less than a carrying over of the full theoretical content or full theoretical mechanisms (even in “approximate” form). … There was continuity or accumulation in the shift, but the continuity is one of form or structure, not of content (Worrall 1989, 117).

The structural realist's criterion of commitment is to the approximately preserved equations of the old theory, which are limiting cases of the equations of the new theory, but are nevertheless fully recovered by it. This is the case with successful theories of the past that satisfy the correspondence principle, which means that they recover the equations of the old theory as limiting cases. Such is the case with Newton’s equations, according to Worrall, which are limiting cases of Einstein’s equations. 
Ladyman (1998) characterises Worrall’s structural realism as epistemic and introduces ontic structural realism which intends to capture an extra requirement coming from current physics, in particular quantum mechanics. He claims that contemporary science provides us with motivation to dispense with the notion of objecthood and commit only to the existence of structure. While epistemic structural realism, as developed by Worrall, is agnostic as to whether there are entities comprising the structure that our successful theories capture, ontic structural realism makes the stronger (metaphysical) claim that there are no such entities, that structure is all there is. 
	To conclude, according to structural realism, in the shift from one theory to another the ‘ontological’ content is abandoned (reference to a particular entity) but mathematical structure survives. The mathematical structure of the theory, which survives theory change, represents physical structure (relations between ‘things’). We should be realists only about the surviving mathematical structure, which captures the unobservable physical structure.  

4.	The relativized a priori, structural realism and the problem of irrationality

The relation between the relativized a priori and the scientific realism debate has not been widely discussed in the contemporary literature. Some philosophers, nevertheless, have offered arguments relating Friedman’s view to the scientific realism debate, and particularly structural realism, and have suggested that Friedman's desire to stay neutral with regard to the scientific realism debate is untenable (see Edward Slowik's (2006) and Maarten Van Dyck's (2009)). In this section, I discuss McArthur’s recent suggestion that Friedman’s account of the relativized a priori leads to incommensurability and as a consequence to irrationality in theory change. His suggestion is that the problem of irrationality disappears once we adopt structural realism.    
In his (2008), McArthur suggests that Friedman’s account of the relativized a priori is superior to Quinean naturalism in that the former can explain the status and the role played by certain hypotheses in scientific theories. As already mentioned in section 2, according to Friedman, not all hypotheses within a scientific theory are of the same kind. We can differentiate the hypotheses that are empirical from those that are not empirical (but are conventional). The latter play the role of constitutive principles because they are required for the formulation of the empirical laws. Despite its appeal, McArthur argues that Friedman’s account of the relativized a priori is open to a serious objection. As Friedman himself acknowledges (2001), if the concepts that constitute the relativized a priori change their meaning from one theory to another, then this view is vulnerable to the charge of Kuhnian incommensurability, which holds that because terms in different paradigms receive different meaning, scientists endorsing one paradigm cannot communicate with the scientists endorsing another paradigm. The problem of incommensurability, according to Kuhn (1962), leads to irrationality in theory change because the terms in the old and new paradigms have different meanings, something which makes a comparison of the two paradigms impossible. McArthur endorses Kuhn’s argument that meaning change entails irrationality in theory change and argues that Friedman’s view about the relativized a priori leads to the charge of irrationality in theory change and needs amending. 
McArthur argues that we can easily overcome the difficulty of irrationality in theory change if we adopt structural realism. An immediate difficulty for his argument arises from his unconventional formulation of structural realism. After mentioning the traditional forms of epistemic structural realism and ontic structural realism, as developed by Worrall and Ladyman, McArthur suggests that by structural realism he will take the view developed by Anjan Chakravartty (1998), known in the literature as semi-realism. McArthur’s motivation to treat semi-realism as a general structural realist position is that he believes that semi-realism is superior to both epistemic and ontic structural realism, since it avoids objections raised in the literature to both positions. However, we need to acknowledge that these positions are essentially different and employ very different notions of structure, a fact which limits the scope of McArthur's argument. 
Chakravartty’s semi-realism is a blend of epistemic structural realism and entity realism. According to entity realism, all we should be realist about are the entities with which we have established causal contact by detecting and manipulating them experimentally. Chakravartty suggests that even though we cannot commit to the existence of a particular entity, we should commit to the properties used for its detection. In this way, contrary to traditional forms of structural realism, which are either agnostic as to whether there are particular unobservable entities or simply deny there are any, Chakravartty is not silent on this issue. According to him, there is an indication that there are unobservable entities because there are properties that are always detectable together so we can infer that there is an entity possessing them. These properties form a structure and it is this structure, according to him, that survives theory change and we should be realist about. 
Having briefly introduced the different forms of structural realism in the literature, I can now examine McArthur’s argument. He suggests that Friedman’s relativized a priori thesis is the best way to account for the non-empirical, constitutive part of scientific theories but that it entails that every term in the framework gets a different interpretation in another framework. This leads to the problem that if different frameworks give different meanings to their terms, then we fall prey to the incommensurability objection which leads, according to Kuhn, and following him, McArthur, to irrationality in theory change. McArthur's way out of this problem is by adopting 'structural realism' (by which he means semi-realism). By arguing that only the relations between interaction properties are preserved in theory change, and not the ontology, 'structural realism' (semi-realism), McArthur argues, can account for framework change as a rational procedure. Therefore, if we adopt 'structural realism' (semi-realism) we can overcome this difficulty and treat only the relations between the terms of the relativized a priori as preserved in the subsequent theory.  According to McArthur:

A structural realist [semi-realist], as we have seen, is not committed to the interpretation of an entity named in an equation that is given by a particular theory, neither is a structural realist committed to the truth of any particular theoretical ontology. Thus, a structural realist can be quite sanguine about considering any proposed new framework to be rational as long as it preserves established interaction properties at least as limiting cases (McArthur 2008, 15). 

McArthur’s point is that there is “compatibility of Friedman’s view with structural realism which offers a more promising way of looking at theory change” (2008, 5). That is, were we to adopt 'structural realism', the charge of irrationality in theory change from the relativized a priori would easily be blocked because all that matters for the 'structural realist' (semi-realist), in order to believe that theory change is rational, is preserving “the well confirmed interaction properties of superseded theory” (McArthur 2008, 16). McArthur also suggests that the 'structural realist' (semi-realist) can account for the fact that the relativized a priori principles may differ from framework to framework. Since all that matters is preserving the interaction properties, it becomes obvious that different constitutive principles can be adopted – the structural realist does not ontologically commit to them. The conclusion McArthur draws from his analysis is the following: 

a structural realist [semi-realist] is free to accept, or merely provisionally adopt, the theoretical ontology and constitutive a priori assumptions of any given framework, providing it is empirically successful … since a structural realist is not committed to the idea that the internal features of a framework wholly define scientific rationality, she can consider it rational to entertain the adoption of a rival framework that might make very different assumptions. As we saw earlier, since what makes the theory change rational, for the structural realist, is not the retention of a priori principles, but the retention of interaction properties at least as limiting cases (McArthur 2008, 18).

5.	Objections to McArthur's argument

There are several important problems which undermine McArthur's argument. My first concern regards McArthur's formulation of structural realism, which limits the argument to an important degree. The problem stems from identifying semi-realism with other forms of structural realism (epistemic and ontic structural realism). McArthur's motivation for this is that, according to him, semi-realism can avoid objections that undermine traditional forms of structural realism.  
In his (2003) McArthur argues that semi-realism is superior to epistemic structural realism because it avoids the Newman objection, which threatens to undermine the latter. But this move seems unjustified. First of all, it is no surprise that the Newman objection does not apply to semi-realism since the notion of structure employed by the semi-realist is essentially different to the one employed by the structural realist. Chakravartty does not employ the 'abstract' notion of structure associated with traditional structural realism but a 'concrete' notion of structure understood as relations between properties of particular objects. Second of all, there is no need for the radical move suggested by McArthur – abandon epistemic structural realism because of the Newman objection and adopt semi-realism. After all most epistemic structural realists believe that the Newman objection can be overcome. Worrall and Zahar (2001) and Melia and Saatsi (2006) have shown ways in which the Ramsey sentence approach to structural realism can avoid the Newman objection. But even if one is not sympathetic to these solutions, one can still adopt a different approach to structural realism, which does not rely on the Ramsey sentence, but however preserves the same notion of structure (see French and Ladyman (2003) on the semantic approach to structural realism). Third of all, McArthur implies that semi-realism is superior to other forms of structural realism because objections to the latter do not apply to the former. Even if that was the case, this does not mean that semi-realism is a more plausible position. It is objectionable that Chakravartty's position can dispense with talking about abstract structure. After all, all concrete structures (the structure of a particular DNA molecule) share an abstract structure in common (the structure of DNA molecules) and the former are simply instances of the latter. 
The important point to be stressed is that the notions of structure employed by traditional structural realism and semi-realism are essentially different. While semi-realism commits us to particular relations between properties and makes an explicit commitment to the existence of unobservable individual entities, epistemic and ontic structural realism are concerned with very different notions of structure. On the epistemic structural realist side, we can either be agnostic as to whether there are unobservable entities or accept their existence but deny the possibility of knowing their properties, while on the ontic structural realist side unobservable objects are denied the property of (intrinsic) individuality and are considered at best as ontologically secondary, contrary to the structure that is considered to be primary. As far as epistemic and ontic structural realism are concerned, it is not the interaction properties that survive theory change but relations between relata (where relata would be understood structurally if one adopts ontic structural realism). In light of this clarification, my concern is that McArthur does not provide an argument for why he believes one can adopt semi-realism as a structural realist view. Apart from the fact that I do not see the justification for adopting semi-realism over structural realism, if semi-realism is to work as a general structural realist view, McArthur needs to show that semi-realism entails structural realism. If such an argument is provided, then the employment of semi-realism over structural realism would be justified. Since McArthur has not argued that structural realism is a subset of semi-realism, we need to acknowledge that his argument is limited only to semi-realism.    
My second worry concerns McArthur’s argument that the retrospective character of Friedman's view disappears if structural realism is employed. Let us start with the problem of  irrationality itself. It is usually argued that rationality in theory change can be established when we look at the empirical predictions of the superseded and superseding theory. We can establish that the shift from non-relativistic physics to relativistic physics was rational, since the latter can account for more empirical phenomena than the former (i.e. the perihelion of Mercury). The charge of incommensurability in this context would be an objection only to those that want to establish successful reference, that is, to the scientific realist​[1]​. Friedman, on the other hand, is not concerned with the scientific realism debate, the only thing he wants to establish is that the transition from Newtonian mechanics to relativity is rational. He does not want to suggest that the transition from Newtonian mechanics to the theory of relativity was rational because the latter has a richer empirical content than the former; he wants to account for how the theory of relativity became an alternative to Newtonian mechanics in the first place, before it was developed into a well-confirmed theory.   
Friedman believes that we can explain how conceiving an alternative theoretical framework can be rational by introducing the idea of 'communicative rationality'. By showing that there is continuity on the level of relativized a priori concepts, Friedman suggests that people living in the pre-relativistic era, having a very different notion of motion, for example, to the people living in the relativistic era, would be able to establish communication because their concepts are not incommensurable but approximations of the concepts employed in the previous theory. Friedman suggests that there is an important continuity in theory change not only in the empirical laws but also on the level of relativized a priori principles, and that the continuity in the latter can avoid the incommensurability objection and show the rationality of theory change. 
	By showing that there is continuity not only on the level of empirical content but also in the constitutive principles, Friedman can establish the communicative rationality and therefore block the Kuhnian objection. However, McArthur does not find this argument sound and suggests that Friedman does not manage to avoid the irrationality objection. The reason for this, McArthur suggests, is because Friedman's solution is retrospective. McArthur argues that only once we are in the subsequent framework can we establish the continuity on the level of empirical and constitutive principles. As a consequence, he still insists, Friedman's view should be amended by employing 'structural realism', which establishes that the transition in theory change is rational whilst ignoring the issue of incommensurability because it does not require successful reference. 
	The fact that structural realism is not concerned with successful reference and establishes rationality in theory change by looking into the successfully recovered structure and the increasing empirical content of the subsequent theory, does not mean that it can save Friedman's argument and make his solution to the incommensurability objection prospective. The reason is that structural realism and semi-realism, which establish continuity on the level of structure, can only do so retrospectively. Continuity on the level of structure can only be established after the theory change has taken place. A structural realist cannot, from the current perspective of science, know which structures will survive theory change. Only from the perspective of a subsequent theory can we establish what mathematical structure is carried over and what structure is lost. McArthur of course adopts semi-realism which seems to give us very persuasive reasons to believe that interaction properties do survive theory change (since they are properties employed in detecting unobservable entities) and as a consequence we should expect these 'structures' to be preserved in scientific revolutions. However, even this position is subject to the pessimistic meta-induction on the level of structure. As Kyle Stanford (2006) argues, there are structures which have been abandoned in the history of science. This objection seems to undermine the prospective character of structural and semi-realism and makes the rationality which these views establish retrospective. Since not all structural content is carried over into the subsequent theory, that is, there are structure losses, we can only speculate which structures are going to be preserved but cannot, prior to theory change, know what structure is going to be carried over in to the subsequent theory. The justification for structural preservation comes retrospectively, after theory change has taken place and as a consequence the rationality is established only retrospectively. As a consequence, the retrospective character of Friedman's view cannot be resolved by employing structural (or semi-)realism.  
Last, a very serious problem for McArthur's argument stems from Friedman's suggestion that there is preservation of relativized a priori principles in theory change. Unfortunately McArthur does not consider what implications this has for his solution. As he argues:

Consider the shift from classical to relativistic mechanics from a structural realist perspective. As Friedman argues, Newton’s laws of motion among other things serve a constitutive a priori role in classical mechanics (Friedman 2001, 26). These laws no longer function in a constitutive role but serve as limiting cases within the much different framework of special relativity (McArthur 2008, 16). 

What is clearly the case in this example is that we have relativized a priori principles (the three laws of motion in Newtonian mechanics) that survive theory change. These laws are preserved as limiting cases in the special theory of relativity but have lost their constitutive status. In the subsequent theory, these laws simply become part of the empirical content of the theory, that is, they are recovered by the equations as limiting cases. This immediately raises a question about the attitude the structural (or semi-)realist should hold towards this preservation. Since the preserved principles survive as limiting cases in the subsequent theory, they satisfy the criterion of commitment of the structural realist. The structural (and semi-)realist holds that the structural preservation is expressed by the mathematical equations which survive as limiting cases in the subsequent theory. The semi-realist believes that the preservation of interaction properties is represented by the mathematical equations that survive theory change as limiting cases. Such structural preservation also holds on the level of relativized a priori. 	
	Since McArthur subscribes to semi-realism, and given that the relativized a priori has been structurally preserved, McArthur would have to say that this structural preservation is of interaction properties. But it is difficult to see why we should treat the laws of motion, which survive theory change in approximate form, as interaction properties. Interaction properties are supposed to be properties used for detection of unobservable entities, while the surviving equations in this case express quantities of both observable and unobservable entities (mass, acceleration, force). Even more problematic is the fact that if we take Friedman's view seriously, we cannot treat the preserved laws of motion as having had the status of interaction properties in the previous theory, as McArthur's argument would imply. This is because on Friedman's account, prior to the transition to the special theory of relativity, the laws of motion were conventional principles. An even more serious worry arises from the fact that other parts of the relativized a priori in Newtonian mechanics, which McArthur does not account for, such as Euclid’s axioms and the Galilean transformations, also survive theory change. These principles, Friedman argues, are recoverable and their approximate validity is maintained. But these principles are clearly not interaction properties and are clearly not part of the empirical content of special relativity. As a consequence, if McArthur wants to keep his structuralist (or better semi-realist) commitments, he cannot accommodate the preservation of constitutive principles in theory change since they are not interaction properties, even though they satisfy the criterion of the structural realist or the semi-realist. 	

6.	Are structural realism and Friedman's view compatible?

In the previous section I examined McArthur's argument, which relies on the presupposition that there is compatibility between structural realism and Friedman's view. However, I would like to explore in more depth the extent to which we can talk about compatibility of scientific and structural realism with Friedman's view. As we saw, McArthur is strongly convinced that there is compatibility between the two views but he does not offer any arguments to support this view. But one can fail to see any compatibility between the two views. There are two objections one could raise to idea that we can establish the compatibility between Friedman's view about relativized a priori principles and structural realism, without one of the theses being weakened or modified to an important degree. One difficulty lies in the fact that the two views have very different motivations and commitments, so the compatibility does not seem obvious, at least initially. Most importantly, the reason why Friedman's view about relativized a priori principles is taken to be incompatible with any form of realism (scientific realism, semi-realism or structural realism, etc.) stems from the neo-Kantian nature of Friedman's view. Let me develop these points further. 
	An important question that needs consideration is whether we should search for compatibility between Friedman's view and structural realism. One could object against the idea that these views should be conjoined since they are, after all, concerned with different issues. Structural realism is a semi-skeptical view that justifies realism about scientific theories whilst accounting for the pessimistic meta-induction. As it stands, it does not address the problem of rationality in theory change, and I suspect most structural realists would respond to the problem of irrationality along the lines of the argument I discussed in the previous section (by pointing at the increased empirical content of the subsequent theory). Friedman, on the other hand, does not engage in the scientific realism debate and does not take a stance as to whether his view leads to realism or anti-realism. His aim is to show that we can establish that the transition from one theory to another is rational and avoid the Kuhnian objection, despite the fact that different theories have their own conventional packages that may give different meanings to the concepts of the theory. Given their different motivations, one might question the motivation for attempting to establish the compatibility of the two views. I do not subscribe to this objection and believe there are plenty of reasons to search for compatibility between the two views and shall argue that it can indeed be established. 
	A more important objection to the alleged compatibility between the two views regards the Kantian nature of Friedman's view​[2]​. According to Friedman, the relativized a priori principles constitute the object of knowledge, as is the case with the synthetic a priori for Kant, making scientific knowledge mind-dependent. Friedman is explicit that his view does not commit him to either realist or anti-realist notions of truth. He argues that “the present conception of scientific rationality does not involve a parallel conception of scientific truth – either “realist” or “anti-realist”” (Friedman 2001, 68). But given that his thesis is based on the neo-Kantian premise that we cannot discover facts about the world that are independent of our cognitive apparatus, it is suggested that it directly clashes with the metaphysical thesis of scientific and structural realism – the belief that there is a mind-independent reality that scientific theories discover. Scientific realism relies on the premise that there is a mind-independent world which scientific theories can and do uncover. As Stathis Psillos argues, the metaphysical claim “that the world has a definite and mind-independent natural-kind structure” is the basic philosophical presupposition of scientific realism (Psillos 1999, xix). 
	If the neo-Kantian aspect of Friedman's view is taken seriously, it becomes obvious that there is no compatibility between structural realism and Friedman's view, since the former view holds that knowledge of the world is possible only by employing a priori principles which are mind-dependent, whilst the latter holds that the world is mind-independent and scientific theories can reveal its structure. For structural realism to be compatible with Friedman's view, it has to be modified to stating that knowledge of the (structure of the) world is mind-dependent, therefore abandoning its metaphysical claim. As long as structural realism adopts the metaphysical claim that there is a mind-independent reality, the structure of which is revealed by scientific theories, compatibility between structural realism and Friedman's view cannot be established unless either view is modified. 
	  There are two ways in which I think we can proceed from here on in our quest for establishing the compatibility between Friedman's view and structural realism. It could be shown that structural realism does not necessarily presuppose the metaphysical claim and as a consequence is compatible with Kantianism. Or, it could be argued that Friedman's view should not be understood in such a strong way as to imply mind-dependence and as a consequence does not really clash with scientific and structural realism. I will briefly discuss the first option and concentrate on exploring the second. 
	 The first option suggests that structural realism does not need to rely on the metaphysical claim of scientific realism. As I stressed above, Friedman's view does not seem compatible with scientific and structural realism due to their metaphysical commitment - belief in the existence of a mind-independent world which scientific theories reveal. But not all structural realists employ this premise. After all, structural realism originates within the Kantian framework in Poincaré's work, who does not find his Kantian commitments clashing with his structuralism; rather, they are regarded as motivation for the latter. In his defense of structural realism, Elie Zahar (2007) argues that Poincaré's structural realism has a strong 'Kantian flavour' insofar as it holds that “the deep nature of things cannot be directly apprehended; for the latter are not grasped as they are in themselves but as they appear though the medium of experience and thought” (Zahar 2007, 52). Zahar believes that there is compatibility between structural realism and the Kantian framework. Of course Poincaré breaks with the Kantian framework insofar as he does not treat our spatial and temporal intuition to be imposed on us by reason. Poincaré allows for the existence of non-Euclidean geometries and claims that some knowledge of the noumenal world is possible, but it does not consist in knowing the intrinsic properties of the noumena. Poincaré allows for knowledge of the relations that hold among the noumena but not of their intrinsic nature. From this perspective structural realism does seem compatible with Kantianism, since it is grounded in the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal world. 
	Even though Friedman's view seems perfectly compatible with such 'internal' realism, I want to suggest that it can also be compatible with 'external' realism (realism employing the mind-independence premise). What I want to investigate is the extent to which Friedman's view really implies mind-dependence, which is in conflict with the metaphysical premise of structural and scientific realism. I will argue that the desired compatibility can be established since Friedman's notion of relativized a priori is much weaker than the Kantian synthetic a priori and does not imply mind-dependence. 
	The second way in which compatibility between structural realism and Friedman's view could be established is by weakening the latter. This requires a good deal of understanding of the notion of relativized a priori and the extent to which it is Kantian. Friedman's relativized a priori is clearly motivated by the Kantian synthetic a priori; but in what sense are these two notions similar? Kant's notion of synthetic a priori has the following aspects: necessary truth, impossibility of conceiving its negation, unrevisability and constitutivity. Friedman's relativized a priori, on the other hand, does not keep the notion of the constitutive principles being necessary truths; we can conceive their negation, and they are revisable. What the relativized a priori preserves is the notion of constitutivity.
	Stathis Psillos and Dimitra Christopoulou (2009) have suggested that the notion of relativized or functional a priori can be understood as a middle ground position between the 'absolute rejection' of the a priori, associated with Quine, and its 'absolute conception', associated with Kant. For Kant, the idea of a principle being a necessary presupposition for knowledge goes hand-in-hand with the idea of this principle being necessarily true and not revisable by experience. Since a principle is  prior to empirical knowledge it cannot be revised on empirical grounds. On the other hand, Quine, argue Psillos and Christopoulou, goes for the 'absolute rejection' of the a priori. No justification independent of experience is possible – everything is subject to revision; mathematical principles and theories are no less subject to revision as are the law of thermodynamics or the law of universal gravitation. Since the synthetic a priori carries the aspect of immunity to revision – experience is not sufficient to refute a principle which is synthetic a priori – no such principles are possible on the 'absolute rejection' view. The notion of a priori which Friedman attempts to establish is between these two extremes of Kant and Quine. The relativized a priori is supposed to keep the constitutive character of the synthetic a priori, while allowing for its revision and non-unique character. As a consequence, it is not necessarily true and unrevisable but rather is a provisional presupposition for knowledge. 
	Friedman's notion of relativized a priori goes contra Kant because Friedman does not hold that the relativized a priori principles are necessary truths. He also allows for their revision, modification and abandonment. Contra Quine, Friedman denies epistemic holism – he believes that elements in a scientific theories have different epistemic status and some elements (the relativized a priori principles) play a constitutive role for the empirical content of the theory. Is this notion of relativized a priori 'strong' enough to imply mind-dependence? 
	The first thing to emphasise is that relativized a priori principles are not  justified independently of experience. This is an important aspect of the notion of synthetic a priori but the notion of relativized a priori does not imply that these principles have any justification that is independent of experience. No justification, empirical or a priori, of the constitutive principles is possible once they are incorporated in a theory. As a consequence, we should not understand Friedman as suggesting that the constitutive principles need to be justified independently of experience in order to be constitutive. Moreover, Friedman explicitly states that these principles are discovered by experience and as a consequence their justification is not a priori. For example, the principle of equivalence, which Friedman holds (Friedman 2001, 102) that has a relativized a priori status in GTR, has empirical origin. However, it is no longer empirical once it has been transformed into a constitutive principle. Arthur Pap (1946) also argues that what comes to be 'functional' a priori in one theory originates in experience and is transformed into a functional a priori principle by the act of idealization and formalization. Friedman does not agree with Pap's suggestion because “what is functionally a priori is simply what is especially well confirmed and established, and, in this way, Pap's approach is ultimately no different from Quine's appeal to entrenchment” (2001, 88). But the disagreement between Friedman and Pap regards exactly which principles are going to be constitutive – Friedman does not want to adopt the notion of entrenchment and for that reason disagrees with Pap. However, Pap's suggestion makes an important point which Friedman also shares – that the constitutive principles do have empirical origin. Therefore the question on which we should concentrate is not how we discover constitutive principles (they can have empirical origin) but what their status and role is in the scientific theories in which they are employed. This goes very well with Ben-Menahem's suggestion (2006) that Poincaré's conventionalism should be seen as establishing a new epistemic category. Seen this way, we no longer have to focus on the question of justification and should not take it that the relativized a priori implies in any way justification independent of experience. 
	Since the relativized a priori principles are revisable, originate in experience, and are not necessary truths, is what sense are they a priori? The only aspect which the relativized a priori shares with Kant's synthetic a priori is the aspect of these principles being constitutive. Is the notion of constitutivity strong enough to rule out any compatibility between the metaphysical premise of scientific realism and Friedman's view? That is, is the notion of constitutive conventions strong enough to imply mind-dependence? I fail to see how the constitutive character of the relativized a priori entails mind-dependence. The relativized a priori clearly has a more limited scope than the Kantian synthetic a priori – it is not constitutive of our experience and does not constitute the object of knowledge but rather is constitutive of a specific scientific theory. Since these principles are discovered by experience and are transformed into constitutive principles, I do not believe that the notion of relativized a priori imposes any sense of mind-dependence.
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^1	 	 Scientific realists have of course suggested solutions to the problem of incommensurability (see Psillos (2007)). Also note that there are two aspects of McArthur's point which should not be conflated:  rationality in theory change and realism about scientific theories. The former does not necessarily lead to the latter. Larry Laudan (1977), for example, believes we can establish that theory change is rational even though he is not realist about scientific theories. 
^2	 	 In his (2009) van Dyck emphasises the incompatibility of scientific realism with Friedman's view and further suggests that Friedman's claim about convergence of constitutive principles cannot be accomodated on the basis of his Kantianism but cannot also be read as realist.   
